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This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If 
the institution governs only its members, players  have an incentive to free ride on the 
institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. 
Addressing this second-order social dilemma, we study the effectiveness of three different 
minimum participation requirements: 1. full participation / unanimity  rule; 2. partial 
participation; 3. unanimity first and in case of failure partial participation. While unanimity is 
most effective once established, one might suspect that a weaker minimum participation rule 
is preferable in practice as it might facilitate the formation of the institution. The data of our 
laboratory experiment do not support this latter view, though. In  fact, weakening the 
participation requirement does not increase the number of implemented institutions. Thus, we 
conclude that the most effective participation requirement is the unanimity rule which leaves 
no room for free riding on either level of the social dilemma. 
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discussions. 1 Introduction
The provision of public goods is a social dilemma that has attracted a lot of
attention ever since the seminal article of Samuelson (1954). Many solutions have
been proposed so far, all relying on some institution that sets the rule of the game
such as to provide individuals the incentive to contribute the ecient amount to
the public good. These institutions can be characterized either by centralized
or decentralized sanctioning (punishment and reward) and the sanctioning can
either be formal (monetary transfers) or informal (e.g. social ostracism).1
While institutions have been shown to be eective not only theoretically but
also empirically, the main hindrance to their adoption is the fact that the im-
plementation itself is a public goods problem. Obviously, any selsh individual
prefers others to install the institution and provide the public good. Hence, it is
questionable whether the institution will be implemented at all if membership is
voluntary. In the present paper, we focus on this second order public goods prob-
lem and study the endogenous formation of an institution that, once established,
enforces ecient contributions to a public good by all its members.
There is a large theoretical literature on endogenous institution (coalition)
formation in the context of global environmental problems (see e.g. Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Finus and Rund-
shagen, 2003) yielding the pessimistic result that stable coalitions usually com-
prise only few members and hence eciency is low.2 In these models there are
no restrictions on the size of coalitions. A straightforward question therefore is
whether eciency could be increased under appropriate restrictions on coalition
size. A natural restriction would be a minimum participation requirement and in
fact minimum participation rules are very common in international environmen-
tal agreements. The Kyoto protocol, for example, had to be ratied by at least
1Examples for centralized formal sanctioning institutions are the mechanisms proposed by
Groves and Ledyard (1977), Moore and Repullo (1988), Abreu and Sen (1990), Palfrey and
Srivastava (1991), Jackson (1992), Falkinger (1996) and more recently Gerber and Wichardt
(2009a, 2009b). Decentralized sanctioning with punishment or rewards being executed by
players themselves have been studied among others by Fehr and G achter (2000, 2002), Masclet
et al. (2003) and Sefton et al. (2007).
2Stability here refers to the notion of cartel stability introduced by d'Aspremont et al. (1993).
255 parties accounting for at least 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990
before entering into force. Other treaties like the Convention for the Protection
of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic required ratication by
all abutting nations. Rutz (2001) has analyzed data provided by the Interna-
tional Center for Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) showing that the
number of international environmental treaties that do not contain any minimum
participation requirement is negligible.
Focusing on the consequences of minimum participation requirements, this
paper addresses the empirical question which minimum participation rule is most
eective in terms of maximizing overall eciency in the context of a simple linear
public goods game. While a stricter requirement leads to the implementation of
larger institutions, and, hence to an increase in eciency whenever an institution
is actually implemented, a weaker requirement may be more eective overall since
it renders the implementation of an institution less vulnerable to a coordination
failure.
In the experiment, groups of four players interacted in an institution forma-
tion game under dierent minimum participation rules covered in three dierent
treatments: In treatment 1 an institution was only implemented when all four
group member joined the institution (unanimity rule). In treatment 2 at least
three group members had to join the institution and in treatment 3 the minimum
participation requirement was relaxed to three in a second institution formation
stage whenever institution formation failed under the unanimity rule in the rst
stage.
According to the data, overall eciency turns out to be largest in those treat-
ments that restrict to or start with the unanimity rule (treatments 1 and 3).
What is more, the total number of institutions is not larger under a weaker min-
imum participation rule than under the unanimity rule.3 From an applied point
of view, the results of our experiment, thus, show that weakening participation
requirements does not improve outcomes. And, although the conditions in our
experiment are very special (e.g. homogenous players, small groups, perfect en-
forcement of contributions by an institution), we believe that the basic ndings
3The total number of institutions under the weak participation requirement is even smaller
than under the unanimity rule. However, the dierence is not signicant.
3are likely to hold in more complex settings as well.
Furthermore, in view of the debate about the importance of social preferences,
it is interesting to note that a substantial proportion of groups implemented
institutions of size three in treatments 2 and 3. This implies that these groups
apparently tolerate that one player free rides on the public goods contributions
of those who joined the institution, which in turn can be interpreted as evidence
against a large proportion of inequality averse subjects.
Regarding the existing literature, our paper is related to a number of ex-
perimental papers on endogenous institution formation, most of which, however,
consider the case where the institution governs all players and hence there is
no second order public goods problem (Walker et al., 2000; G urerk et al., 2006;
Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kroll et al., 2007; Ertan et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010).
Only few papers study coalition formation when the coalition only governs its
members: Kosfeld et al. (2009) provide experimental evidence on the endogenous
formation of a punishing institution showing that in most cases all players be-
come members of the institution if an institution is formed at all. Dannenberg
et al. (2010) compare the eectiveness of institutions that dier in the level of
public good provision required from its members. The experimental data shows
that weakening the rules such as to lower the free riding incentives in general
does not increase overall eciency which is akin to our result that eciency is
not increased under a weaker minimum participation rule. In a follow-up pa-
per, Dannenberg (2011) studies coalition formation when members can vote on
a binding minimum provision level of the public good and nds that social wel-
fare is independent of the voting rule. In all of these papers players could form
institutions of arbitrary size, while we set out to study institution formation
under dierent minimum participation rules. A further interesting exception is
Hamman et al. (forthcoming), who study the eects of endogenous delegation of
contribution decisions to an allocator whose decision only aects those who de-
cided to vote. They nd that delegation in general improves contributions to the
public good and that allowing players to communicate increases the frequency of
(endogenous) delegation.
Moreover, our paper is related to Carraro et al. (2009) who analyze a model
of coalition formation under a minimum participation rule which is endogenously
4determined by unanimity voting before the coalition formation stage.4 The au-
thors derive conditions on the players' payo functions under which a particular
minimum participation requirement (including the unanimity rule) is chosen in
equilibrium.
The outline of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model of
endogenous institution formation under a minimum participation rule and derive
the theoretical predictions for standard and social preferences. In Section 3 we
present the design of our laboratory experiment. The experimental results are
provided in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model and Theoretical Predictions
2.1 The Basic Model
Consider the following symmetric linear public goods game PG with n  2 play-
ers. Each player i has a private endowment w > 0 and can choose to contribute
gi 2 [0;w] to the public good. For given contributions g = (g1;:::;gn) player i's
payo is




where a with 1
n < a < 1 is the marginal benet from contributions to the public
good. Since a < 1, g0
i = 0 is a dominant strategy for all i, which implies that the
game has a unique Nash equilibrium where no one contributes to the public good.
However, since na > 1, the welfare maximizing strategy prole is g = (w;:::;w).
Suppose now that before playing PG players can decide whether to join an
institution that enforces full contributions to the public good.5 For the sake of
argument, we assume that the institution is costless (the subsequent results do not
change as long as the welfare gain of full public good contributions outweighs the
costs, though). The institution is implemented if and only if an exogenously given
4This modeling raises the obvious question why the unanimity voting rule is not chosen
endogenously as well. It is self-evident that there is no limit to the number of stages that could
be added in order to endogenize the rules under which the rules of the game are determined.
5We treat the institution as a black box as the specic mechanism which implements the
desired contributions is of no relevance for our analysis.
5minimum participation requirement is met. If the institution is implemented, all
members are forced to contribute their full endowment to the public good, while
all non-members can freely choose their contribution level. More precisely, for
any given minimum participation requirement m with 1  m  n we consider
the following two-stage institution formation game IFm:
Stage 1: All players simultaneously decide whether to join the institution or
not.
Stage 2: If at least m players joined the institution in stage 1, the institution
is implemented. All members i of the institution are restricted to contribute
their full endowment w to the public good, i.e. gi = w, while all non-members j
simultaneously choose their contribution gj 2 [0;w]. If less than m players joined
the institution in stage 1, the institution is not implemented and all players i
simultaneously choose their contribution gi 2 [0;w]. Players' payos are given
by (1).
We also consider another institution formation game where the minimum
participation requirement is weakened if no institution is implemented under
a stricter minimum participation requirement. In particular, we consider the
following three-stage institution formation game, IFmk, where m is the minimum
participation requirement in a rst participation phase and k < m is the minimum
participation requirement in a second participation phase:
Stage 1a: All players simultaneously decide whether to join the institution or
not.
Stage 1b: If at least m players joined the institution, the game moves to stage
2. Otherwise, players again decide simultaneously whether to join the institution
or not.
Stage 2: If at least m players joined the institution in stage 1a or at least
k players joined the institution in stage 1b, the institution is implemented. All
members i of the institution are restricted to contribute their full endowment w to
the public good, i.e. gi = w, while all non-members j simultaneously choose their
6contribution gj 2 [0;w]. Otherwise, if less than m players joined the institution in
stage 1a and less than k players joined the institution in stage 1b, the institution
is not implemented and all players i simultaneously choose their contribution
gi 2 [0;w]. Players' payos are given by (1).
In the following we characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
for standard preferences as well as for social preferences as proposed by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).
2.2 Institution Formation with Standard Preferences
Under standard preferences a player's utility equals her payo, i.e. ui(g) = i(g)
for all contribution proles g = (g1;:::;gn). The following proposition provides
a characterization of the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the
institution formation games (the proof is straightforward and therefore omitted).6
Proposition 2.1 Let ui = i for all players i.
(i) Let ma > 1. Then in any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of IFm either an institution with exactly m members is implemented or no
institution is implemented.
(ii) Let m > k and ka > 1. Then in any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of IFmk either an institution with exactly m members is imple-
mented in stage 1a or an institution with exactly k members is implemented
in stage 1b or no institution is implemented.
Note that, by Proposition 2.1, all institution formation games have subgame
perfect equilibria in which no institution is implemented. From a social planner's
point of view, this might seem unsatisfactory as it implies that in theory none
of the institution formation games is strictly preferable. However, the dierent
socially undesirable equilibria are all such that all players are indierent between
joining and not joining the institution; this is due to the fact that the commitment
entailed in the decision to join is only binding if suciently many others join as
6There also exist subgame perfect Nash equilibria in mixed strategies.
7well. One may therefore argue that such equilibria are inherently unstable. Facing
a similar problem, Kosfeld et al. (2009) focus on strict equilibria:7
Denition 2.1 A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game
is called stagewise strict, if in every stage game every player's strategy is a
unique best response to the equilibrium strategies of the other players.
Using this strictness renement the following result is straightforward.
Proposition 2.2 Let ui = i for all players i and let ma > 1. Then, in any
stagewise strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of IFm, an institution with
exactly m members is implemented.
Unfortunately, the strictness requirement is too strong for IFmk. In all subgame
perfect Nash equilibria of IFmk no institution is formed in at least one stage of the
game and hence, for at least one player the corresponding equilibrium strategy is
no unique best response. Thus, there exists no stagewise strict subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in IFmk.8
2.3 Institution Formation with Social Preferences
Experimental research over the last years has provided ample evidence for behav-
ior being governed by social preferences. In the context of institution formation,
players with social preferences may prefer no institution over an institution that
is implemented by a subgroup of players, because the latter yields unequal payos
7In the sequel, we refer to these equilibria as \stagewise strict" in order to avoid any confusion
with the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium of a normal form game. Note that the notion of
a stagewise strict Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium in
the agent normal form of the extensive game.
8A possible way to derive a stricter prediction for IFmk is to focus on cases where at least
one player is not indierent between his equilibrium strategy and some other strategy. One
way to do so is to consider only subgame perfect Nash equilibria for which in every stage game
there exists at least one player whose equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to the
equilibrium strategies of the other players. If we apply this renement, in the only remaining
equilibria of IFmk an institution with exactly k members is implemented in stage 1b.
8to members and non-members if non-members have no incentives to contribute
to the public good. For tractability reasons and in order to compare our results
to those of Kosfeld et al. (2009), we apply the social preference model by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), where players are assumed to be inequality averse.9 The
payos of the players are given by  = (1;:::;n) as above. The utility of a













The two parameters i and i measure the reduction of player i's utility due to
disadvantageous inequality and advantageous inequality, respectively. Typically,
it is assumed that i  i for all i and that 0  i < 1, which we also apply here.
In the sequel, we analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the institu-
tion formation games IF4, IF3 and IF43 conditional on the inequality aversion
parameters of the players. To begin with, we note that, for the linear public
good game with payos given in (1), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that it is a
dominant strategy for each player with a+i < 1 to choose gi = 0. Furthermore,
they also prove that, if h denotes the number of players with a + i < 1 and the
condition h
n 1 > a
2 is met, the unique equilibrium is gi = 0 for all i.
Now, suppose that there exists at least one player with a+i < 1 ( () i <
0:6). Then, if no institution is formed, every player i gets a payo (and utility,
since there is no inequality) of ui = w. If a 4-player institution is formed, the
utility is 4aw = 1:6w for all players. By contrast, if h = 0, i.e. i  0:6 for all i,
there are multiple equilibria in the public good game without institution where
each player contributes gi = g 2 [0;w]. In this case, all players i receive a payo
(and utility) of ui = w+g(4a 1) = w+0:6g when no institution is formed. The
following result then is straightforward.
Proposition 2.3 Let ui be given as in (2) for all i. Then, for all types of players
in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of IF4, either an institution with four
members is implemented or no institution is implemented.
9We note that there are other models of social preferences and more specically inequity
aversion, among them Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), and Cox et
al. (2007).
9As a next step, we consider the case where the minimum participation re-
quirement is 3 (IF3 or stage 1b of IF43). In order to determine the players'
utilities if a 3-player institution is implemented, we have to distinguish between
the following three cases depending on the preferences of the non-member j:
 If j < 0:6, then j contributes gj = 0 and utilities are given by ui = 3aw  
i
3 w = 1:2w  
i
3 w for the members and uj = w +3aw  jw = 2:2w  jw
for the non-member.
 If j > 0:6, then j contributes gj = w and all players receive 4aw = 1:6w
as in the 4-player institution.
 If j = 0:6, the non-member j is indierent between all contributions in
[0;w] and always receives a utility of 4aw = 1:6w. For the members of the
institution, this results into utilities between 3aw  
i
3 w = 1:2w  
i
3 w and
4aw = 1:6w depending on gj 2 [0;w].
Joining a 4-player institution is only a best response for a player i with i  0:6
since i receives a utility w+3aw iw = 2:2w iw when deviating (i.e. not joining
the institution) and 2:2w   iw > 4aw = 1:6 if and only if i < 0:6. Joining a
3-player institution is a best response for player i if 3aw  
i
3 w  w , i  0:6.
Thus, we can characterize the behavior of three types of subjects:
Type 1: i  i  0:6 and i < 0:6. This includes players with standard
preferences who have parameters i = i = 0. A player of type 1 is weakly
averse against disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. It is a dominant
strategy for this type to choose gi = 0 whenever the player is not a member of
an institution.
Type 2: i > 0:6 > i. A player of type 2 is strongly averse against disadvan-
tageous inequality but only weakly averse against advantageous inequality. For
this type it is a dominant strategy to choose gi = 0 whenever the player is not a
member of an institution.
10Type 3: i  i  0:6. A player of type 3 is strongly averse against disad-
vantageous and advantageous inequality. If i > 0:6, it is a dominant strategy
for this type to choose gi = w whenever an institution forms and the player is
not a member of the institution. If i = 0:6, this type is indierent between
all contributions in [0;w] whenever an institution forms and the player is not a
member.
Apparently, types 1 and 2 always prefer to be non-member of a 3-player in-
stitution over being a member of a 4-player institution as these types are only
weakly averse against advantageous inequality. Hence, for weaker minimum par-
ticipation requirements only type 3 players will form 4-player institutions. More-
over, no type 2 player would want to be part of a 3-player institution if the
non-member does not contribute fully to the public good as this type is strongly
averse against disadvantageous inequality. Thus, no 3-player institution will form
if there is more than one player of type 2 or the non-member is not of type 3 and
hence contributes fully. Type 1 players on the other hand have no reservations
against being members of 3-player institutions.
Thus, using the above type-classication, we obtain the following straightfor-
ward results for IF3 and IF43.
Proposition 2.4 Let ui be given as in (2) for all i and consider the institution
formation game IF3.
(i) The implementation of a 4-player institution is supported as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if all players are of type 3.
(ii) The implementation of a 3-player institution is supported as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if either at least one player is of type
3 or at least three players are of type 1.
(iii) No institution is always supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
and it is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome if at least two
players are of type 2 and no player is of type 3.
From Proposition 2.4 it follows that social preferences can be detrimental for
eciency under a weak minimum participation requirement: If no player has a
11strong aversion against advantageous inequality and at least two players have a
strong aversion against disadvantageous inequality no institution is formed and
welfare is minimized in equilibrium.
Finally, we derive the equilibrium outcomes of IF43:
Proposition 2.5 Let ui be given as in (2) for all i and consider the institution
formation game IF43.
(i) The implementation of a 4-player institution in stage 1a is always supported
as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
(ii) The implementation of a 4-player institution in stage 1b is supported as a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if all players are of type 3.
(iii) The implementation of a 3-player institution in stage 1b is supported as a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if either at least one player is
of type 3 or at least three players are of type 1.
(iv) No institution is always supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Predictions
From the previous analysis, we can derive a number of testable predictions. All
predictions are derived under the assumption that players either all have standard
or social preferences of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) type and that not all players
are strongly averse against advantageous inequality (type 3).
Prediction 1 The formation of an institution increases the level of public good
provision.
Concerning the average size of an institution, the theoretical analysis yields
a clear prediction for IF4 and IF3 only, which we state as our second prediction:
Prediction 2 The average size of the institutions that are implemented is larger
the stricter the minimum participation requirement, i.e. the average size of an
institution in IF3 is smaller than four.
12Concerning the number of implemented institutions and, hence, overall ef-
ciency achieved by the dierent minimum participation rules, our theoretical
analysis yields ambiguous predictions, which is due to the multiplicity of equilib-
ria and the sensitivity towards the types of the players in case of social prefer-
ences. On the one hand one may predict that more institutions are implemented
and hence the level of public good provision is higher under a stricter minimum
participation requirement, since (1) the formation of a three-player institution
involves a coordination problem, which may very likely result in miscoordina-
tion and a complete failure to implement an institution, and (2) the presence of
type 2 players, who are strongly averse against disadvantageous but not against
advantageous inequality, may preclude the implementation of a three-player in-
stitution. Following this line of argument we would predict that more institutions
are implemented in IF4 than in IF3 and that IF43 is somewhere in between. On
the other hand, under all minimum participation rules the implementation of an
institution may simply fail because some players expect that everyone is playing
the no institution equilibrium. This kind of miscoordination is more likely to
lead to a failure to implement an institution under a strict than under a weak
minimum participation requirement. If we follow this argument we would predict
that more institutions are implemented in IF3 than in IF4 and that again IF43 is
somewhere in between. Given these opposing eects of a change in the minimum
participation rule we would predict:
Prediction 3 The number of implemented institutions is the same for all mini-
mum participation rules.
From Predictions 1-3 we derive our nal prediction:
Prediction 4 The level of public good provision is larger the stricter the min-
imum participation requirement, i.e. there are more contributions to the public
good in IF4 than in IF3.
133 The Experiment
Our experimental design consists of the three treatments IF4, IF3 and IF43. In
all treatments subjects play ten rounds of the symmetric linear public good game
with endowment w = 20 and the marginal benet parameter a = 0:4.
At the beginning of each round, subjects were asked whether they want to
join an institution and thereby committing themselves to contribute their whole
endowment to the public good if the institution is implemented. The three treat-
ments dier from each other only in the minimum participation requirement of
institution formation, and the subjects play the standard public goods game if
no institution is implemented.
After the institution formation stage all subjects are informed whether an
institution has been implemented or not. If an institution is implemented in
IF4, all subjects automatically contribute their full endowment to the public
good. If an institution with three members is implemented in treatments IF3
and IF43, the non-member can choose her contribution to the public good while
the members of the institution only get informed that they are members of a
three-player institution. At the end of each round, a summary screen is shown
with the subject's individual contribution to the public good, the total group
contribution and the subject's individual payo in this round.
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the School
of Business, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Hamburg between
January and May 2011. In total, we ran nine sessions (three per treatment) with
196 mainly undergraduate students predominantly from the social sciences. In
each session 20   24 students participated, resulting in 17 groups for IF4 and 16
groups each for treatments IF3 and IF43. We used z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) for
programming and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) for recruiting.
Each session started with a short introduction after which the instructions
were read aloud, so that all participants knew that everyone received the same
instructions. The actual experiment did not start until each subject had correctly
answered a set of control questions. Subjects were then randomly matched into
groups of four players who stayed together throughout the entire experiment
(partner matching), however the identities of group members remained unknown.
14At the end of the experiment, one of the ten rounds was chosen at random
as the round determining the earnings of the subjects.10 The exchange rate
between Euro and experimental currency units (ECU) was 1 : 3. Additionally,
subjects received a show-up fee of 4 Euro. The payment was carried out after
a nal questionnaire which included socio-demographic data and the Big-Five-
Inventory-Shortversion (BFI-S). The sessions lasted 60   90 minutes including
instructions, control questions, questionnaire and payment. On average, a subject
earned 13 Euro.
4 Results
In the sequel, we present the dierent results from the experiment.
4.1 Aggregate Behavior
4.1.1 Eciency of Institutions
To begin with, we consider the general eect of institutions being present. Figure 1
depicts average contribution levels when an institution is formed and when no
institution is formed. As hypothesized, for all three treatments there are more
contributions to the public good when an institution is implemented. For IF4,
the average contribution obviously is 20 if an institution is formed, whereas it is
only approximately 5:2 when no institution is formed. IF3 records mean contri-
butions of 16:5 if an institution is formed and 3:7 respectively if not. Subjects
in IF43 on average contributed 18:6 to the public good when an institution was
formed and 5:5 when no institution was formed.
These dierences between contributions with and without institutions are
conrmed by several Mann-Whitney tests using the average contribution per
group over all periods as one independent observation. For all treatments, the
dierences between the contributions when an institution is implemented and
when no institution is implemented are signicant on a 1%-level, which conrms
Prediction 1:
10A ten-sided dice was thrown in public by the supervisor of the experiment in order to select
the payment round.
15Result 1 Average contributions to the public good are higher with than without
an institution.
4.1.2 Comparing Dierent Minimum Participation Requirements
Figure 1 also shows that average contributions to the public good when no in-
stitution is formed are only slightly dierent in the three treatments (5:2, 3:7
and 5:5). This observation is conrmed by Mann-Whitney tests, which report
no signicant dierences. However, Figure 2 paints a dierent picture when all
contributions are taken into account. In total, the average contributions are 13:6
in IF4, 12:4 in IF43 and 9:3 in IF3 respectively, indicating that IF4 and IF43
produce higher contributions to the public good than IF3 (Mann-Whitney test
5%-level). Yet, although the provision level is slightly higher in IF4 than in IF43,
we do not nd signicant dierences in the public good provision between these
































Figure 2: Average contributions across treatments in periods 1-10.
Result 2 Contributions to the public good are higher in IF4 and IF43 than in
IF3, while there is no signicant dierence between IF4 and IF43. When no
institution is implemented, all treatments lead to the same level of public good
provision.
These results are conrmed by the regression depicted in Table 1, where IF4
is used as the baseline treatment. We also included age, sex and the big ve
personality traits from the questionnaire in the regression. However, the eects
on the coecients for IF3 and IF43 are negligible and in all our regressions
the socio-demographic variables and BIG5 personality traits show no consistent
and mostly insignicant eects on the behavior of the subjects. We therefore
do not report the coecients of these variables in our tables. Table 1 shows
that, in accordance with our prediction, the contributions to the public good
are signicantly lower in IF3 than in IF4 (1% signicance). Contributions are
also lower in IF43 than in IF4 but the coecient is not signicantly dierent
17from zero. These observations conrm Prediction 4 and in addition show that
overall eciency is the same in IF4 and IF43, which we could not derive from
our theoretical analysis.







Observations N = 1960
Table 1: GLS regression results for public goods contributions across treatments.
Contributions in IF4 are baseline. IF3 (IF43) is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the treatment is IF3 (IF43) and 0 otherwise. Std. errors in parentheses
are adjusted for group clusters. p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
A straightforward conjecture is that Result 2 can be explained by the num-
ber and size of the institutions implemented in the dierent treatments. Table 2
reports the percentages of dierent institution sizes across treatments. We nd
that the observed dierences in contributions to the public good cannot be ex-
plained with the total number of formed institutions. Although there are more
institutions implemented in IF4 (institutions implemented in 57% of the cases)
than in IF43 (53%) and IF3 (44%), these dierences are not signicant.11 Thus,
the following result conrms Prediction 3:
Result 3 There is no dierence in the number of institutions implemented in all
treatments.
11For these tests, the number of institutions per group were used as one independent obser-
vation.
18Inst. Size IF4 IF3 IF43
4 57% 9% 35%
3 0% 35% 18%
Total 57% 44% 53%
Table 2: Size of institutions (proportion of institutions of size 4 and 3, respec-
tively, taken over all groups and all periods).
We continue by comparing the dierent sizes of institutions across treatments.
The percentages of institutions with four members are 35% in IF43 and 9% in
IF3. Again applying Mann-Whitney tests, we can establish that there are more
institutions with four members in IF4 than in IF43 (10% signicance) and IF3 (1%
signicance). Also, groups form 4-player institutions more frequently in IF43 than
in IF3 (5% signicance). Yet, there are more institutions with three members
in IF3, 35%, than in IF43, 18% (1% signicance). Overall, Mann-Whitney tests
show that the average size of an institution formed in IF4 is larger than the
average size of an institution in IF3 or IF43 (1% signicance each). Furthermore,
the average size of an institution in IF43 is larger than in IF3 (5% signicance).
This conrms Prediction 2 and even extends it to IF43. We summarize in our
next result:
Result 4 On average, the largest institutions are formed in IF4, and institutions
are larger in IF43 than in IF3.
Moreover, the contribution of a non-member when an institution of size 3
has been formed does not dier between IF3 and IF43, as the non-member on
average contributes 2:5 to the public good in both treatments. A Mann-Whitney
test conrms that in IF3 the contribution of a non-member when an institution
is implemented is signicantly lower than the contribution if no institution has
been formed (5% signicance). In IF43, however, there is no such dierence.
We explore the institution formation in IF43 in more detail. Figure 3 depicts
the proportion of cases in which an institution of size three or four is formed in
19stage 1a and 1b, respectively. 62% of the institutions are formed already in stage
1a and only 38% in stage 1b. A Mann-Whitney test conrms that this dierence is
signicant (5%-level). Furthermore, three institutions of size 4 were even formed

















Figure 3: Institutions formed in IF43 in periods 1-10 (proportion of cases with
an institution of size 3 or 4 in stage 1a and 1b).
Summarizing, the observations concerning the number and size of institutions
support the ndings regarding the contributions across treatments: While there
is no dierence in the total number of institutions in IF3 and IF43, the latter has
signicantly more 4-player institutions leading to higher average contributions in
IF43 than in IF3. There are also more 4-player institutions in IF4 than in IF43
but the dierence is only weakly signicant. This, together with the fact that
there is also a number of 3-player institutions in IF43 may explain why we do
not observe a signicant dierence in the contributions between IF4 and IF43.
204.2 Individual Behavior
Having analyzed the dierences in aggregate outcomes across treatments, we now
proceed to explore individual behavior under the dierent minimum participation
requirements.
4.2.1 Decision to Join the Institution
In order to further understand the participation decisions of the subjects across
treatments, we performed two probit regressions. The results are presented in
Table 3. The regressions depict the impact of the dierent treatments on the
probability to join the institution. The two regressions dier in the way that
the \join" decision is dened for IF43; in (1) only stage 1a is considered, in (2)
the ultimate decision in each period is used. That is, if no institution has been
formed in stage 1a, then the decision in stage 1b is used in the regression. We
nd that in the treatments IF3 and IF43 the probability that a subject joins the
institution is lower compared to IF4 (1% signicance), and that the probability
is even less for IF3 than for IF43 (5% signicance).12 Regression (2) shows that
the willingness to join the institution in IF43 is less when also considering the
decision in stage 1b; it is then not signicantly higher than in IF3.13
Result 5 The probability that a subject joins an institution is higher in IF4 than
in IF3 and IF43.
Observe that Result 5 is consistent with Results 3 and 4: The higher the
probability to join an institution the higher the probability that a 4-player insti-
tution is formed. On the other hand, for given probabilities to join an institution,
the probability that an institution is formed decreases with the minimum partic-
ipation requirement. In our case the two eects of a higher probability to join
an institution and a lower probability that an institution is implemented at all
cancel out, so that there is no dierence in the number of institutions formed in
the dierent treatments.
12This regression with IF3 as baseline treatment is not shown in a table. The coecient is
0:634 for IF43 with standard deviation 0:255 and p = 0:013.
13This regression is also not shown in a table. The coecient for IF43 is 0:264 and p = 0:256
with again IF3 as baseline treatment.
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Observations N = 1960 N = 1960
Table 3: Probit regression results for the probability to join the institution across
treatments. Regressions (1) and (2) dier in the denition of the participation
decision in IF43. In regression (1) we use the choice in stage 1a, whereas in (2) we
apply the choice in the ultimate stage, i.e., the decision of stage 1a if an institution
was implemented in stage 1a and the decision of stage 1b otherwise. The decision
to join the institution in IF4 is baseline. IF3 (IF43) is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the treatment is IF3 (IF43) and 0 otherwise. Std. errors in
parentheses adjusted for group clusters. p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
22We again used a Mann-Whitney test to compare IF3 with stage 1b of IF43.
For this test, the number of institutions per group is not suitable to count as
an observation, as the groups in IF43 do not always reach the second stage.
Therefore, we used the number of institutions per group per stage 1b played as one
independent observation.14 We nd that there are more institutions formed in IF3
than in stage 1b of IF43 (Mann-Whitney test 5%-level). Hence, the willingness to
join the institution is higher in IF3 than in stage 1b of IF43. One interpretation of
this nding is that the subjects in IF43 interpret the failure to form an institution
in stage 1a as a signal that at least one player will free ride on the public good
provision of the others which may induce subjects with social preferences not to
join the institution in the second stage.
To test this and to get an understanding of the subjects' individual partic-
ipation decisions, we performed separate probit regressions for all treatments.
These regression results are summarized in Table 4. As treatment IF43 has two
participation stages, we performed regressions for each of the possible stages 1a
and 1b. We nd that for all treatments the decision to join the institution is
largely inuenced by the decision made in the previous period, i.e. a subject is
more likely to join the institution if it had joined already in the previous period.
For IF43 this property needs to be specied for the dierent stages, though. In
stage 1a, the decision of stage 1a of the previous period has an eect, while the
decision in stage 1b of the previous period does not. Similarly, for the decision
in stage 1b, only the decision in stage 1b of the previous period has a signicant
inuence on the choice. In stage 1b of IF43, the decision to join the institution
in stage 1a increases the probability to join the institution also in stage 1b.
Furthermore, we observe that in IF3 and in stage 1b of IF43 a 3-player institu-
tion in the previous period has a negative impact on the subjects' decision to join
the institution. We included a dummy variable for the membership in a 3-player
institution in the previous period in the regressions for IF3 and IF43. However,
this variable and the dummy variable for a 3-player institution in the previous
period are highly correlated (jj  0:79 in each treatment) and we therefore only
report Inst3t 1 in the regressions.
14The played stages vary from one up to ten across the dierent groups.
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Ind. Variable IF4 IF3 IF43-1a IF43-1b
Const.  0:607  4:587  0:375  2:305
(1:306) (1:514) (1:391) (1:319)
Join1t 1:772
(0:225)
Join1t 1 0:853 1:210 0:594 0:231
(0:282) (0:220) (0:228) (0:253)
Join2t 1 0:013 1:140
(0:226) (0:301)
Inst4t 1 0:406  0:669  0:005  0:025
(0:233) (0:284) (0:230) (0:255)
Inst3t 1  0:935  0:290  1:332
(0:302) (0:183) (0:215)
Observations N = 612 N = 576 N = 576 N = 388
Table 4: Probit regression results for the probability to join the institution in
the dierent treatments. The decision not to join the institution is baseline.
Join1t is a dummy variable for IF43 that takes the value 1 if the subject joined
the institution in stage 1a of the current period and is 0 otherwise. Join1t 1
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the subject joined the institution
in the previous period (in stage 1a of the previous period for IF43) and is 0
otherwise. Join2t 1 is a dummy variable for IF43 that takes the value 1 if the
subject joined the institution in stage 1b of the previous period and is 0 otherwise.
Inst4t 1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 4-player institution was
implemented in the previous period and is 0 otherwise. Inst3t 1 is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a 3-player institution was implemented in the
previous period and is 0 otherwise. Std. errors in parentheses adjusted for group
clusters. p < 0:01; p < 0:05; p < 0:1.
244.2.2 Learning
In order to determine if there is any learning over the ten periods, we used
the Spearman-Rank-Order test. We nd that there is no correlation between
contributions to the public good and the periods in IF4 (Spearman- = 0:4) and
IF43 ( =  0:2). Yet, we nd that there is a small negative correlation (10%
signicance,  =  0:6) for IF3. However, this signicance vanishes if we exclude
period 1. For the number of institutions formed per period, there is a slightly
signicant positive correlation for IF4 ( = 0:55, 10% signicance). The other
two treatments show no correlations ( =  0:27 for IF3 and  =  0:01 for IF43).
Furthermore, there is no signicant correlation between the number of choices to
join an institution and the period. All results are quite robust against start-game
and end-game eects, i.e. we obtain the same results if we only consider periods
3 through 8 or 4 through 7.
Result 6 In no treatment there is a signicant change in behavior over time.
4.2.3 Incentives to Opt for Weaker Minimum Participation Rules
Finally, we were interested in the empirical incentives for subjects to free ride.
More specically, while Result 2 shows that on average players' payos are highest
in IF4 and IF43, i.e. whenever the institution formation game starts with a strict
minimum participation requirement, one may ask whether nevertheless certain
player behavior generates higher payos under a weaker minimum participation
requirement. In particular, it could be that a player who intends to free ride on
the institution formation of others earns a higher payo in IF3 and in IF43 than
in IF4. However, it turns out that this is not the case. The average payo of
a player in IF4 is 28.19. Not surprisingly, the payo conditional on joining the
institution in IF4 is even higher, namely 29.00. By comparison, the average payo
of a player who does not join the institution (a free rider) is 27.09 in IF3 and
27.23 in IF43. Although the dierences in payos are not signicant, this shows
that free-riders do not prot from the weakening of the minimum participation
requirement in IF3 or IF43.
Result 7 There is no signicant dierence between the average payo of a free
rider in IF3 and IF43 and a player in IF4.
255 Discussion
In the following, we contrast the results derived in Section 2.3 with the data from
our experiment. To begin with, we consider treatment IF3.
The rst thing to note is that in IF3 we do not observe any signicant contri-
butions by non-members in case of a 3-player institution, suggesting that there
are only few subjects with a strong aversion against advantageous inequality (type
3 players). Moreover, there is only one group which formed 4-player institutions
in six out of ten periods as shown in Figure 4, which is only an equilibrium if all
players are of type 3. In all other groups, 4-player institutions were broken up
immediately in the following period, suggesting that these 4-player institutions
were rather a result of a coordination problem. At the same time, we observe a
substantial number of 3-player institutions (cf. Table 2) from which we conclude
that less than half of all subjects are of type 2 as, by Proposition 2.4, that would
prevent 3-player institutions from being formed if there are no type 3 players.











Figure 4: Institutions formed by the groups in IF3 (0 = no institution, 3 =
3-player institution, 4 = 4-player institution).
More specically, there was one group which did not form any institution at
all in ten periods. We could therefore conclude that there was no subject of
type 3 and at least two subjects of type 2 in this group, as \no institution" then
is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. And in fact a detailed analysis
of the individual decisions reveals that two subjects never decided to join the
26institution. Not joining becomes the dominant strategy for a type 2 player if
he or she believes that there is no type 3 player in the group. Accordingly, we
detected 10 more subjects who joined the institution in at most two periods.
Thus, in total we can identify 12 subjects (19%) whose behavior is consistent
with a type 2 player.
Classifying the remaining 48 subjects who participated in treatment IF3
proves to be more dicult. However, there is evidence that the majority of
these subjects are of type 1, as, by Proposition 2.4, in the absence of type 3
players 3-player institutions are only equilibrium outcomes when at least three
players are of type 1. Thus, in the 12 groups which repeatedly form 3-player
institutions, we may classify at least 36 subjects (56%) as type 1. The type of
the remaining 12 subjects (19%) remains unknown from the data.
We performed a similar analysis for IF43. Just as in IF3, there is one group
that forms 4-player institutions in stage 1b (cf. Figure 5). However, other than
that there is no direct evidence of a type 3 player. Thus, we again conclude that
this type is rather scarce. Moreover, we observe multiple 3-player institutions in
eight groups, suggesting at least three players of type 1 in each group. Besides
these 24 type 1 and four type 3 subjects, we were able to identify 16 subjects
potentially of type 2 by their behavior in stage 1b. All of these 16 subjects chose
not to join the institution in stage 1b in at least 80% percent of the cases.15
Regarding the types of the remaining 20 subjects, we can only speculate as
both a 4-player institution and \no institution" are equilibrium outcomes for all
group compositions. Yet, as repeatedly mentioned above, we nd only little ev-
idence for type 3 players. By contrast, we believe that type 2 subjects, having
correct expectations about the types (and behavior) of the other group members,
should be identiable in stage 1b by their best response not to join the institu-
tion. Therefore, we believe that the 8 subjects who repeatedly reach stage 1b
do not have a strong aversion against disadvantageous inequality and, thus, can
be classied as type 1. This leaves us with a similar type distribution as in IF3.
Table 5 summarizes the analysis for both treatments.
15For this analysis, we excluded those three groups which only reach the stage once or twice.











Figure 5: Institutions formed by the groups in IF43 (0 = no institution, 3 =
3-player institution, 4 = 4-player institution). Dark background marks 4-player
institutions formed in stage 1b.
IF3 IF43
type 1 36 (56%) 32 (50%)
type 2 12 (19%) 16 (25%)
type 3 4 (6%) 4 (6%)
unknown 12 (19%) 12 (19%)
Table 5: Estimation of the type distribution in IF3 and IF43. The total number
of subjects is 64 in both treatments, percentages in parentheses.
286 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the eectiveness of dierent minimum participa-
tion rules for the formation of an institution to provide a public good. Due to a
multiplicity of equilibria it is not clear which rule is optimal from a theoretical
point of view: All minimum participation rules allow for a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, where the formation of an institution fails and hence welfare is min-
imized. This is true independent of whether players have standard preferences or
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences, i.e. they are inequality averse.
The intuitive conjecture, that in practice a weaker minimum participation
requirement increases the number of institutions and hence increases eciency
is not conrmed by our laboratory experiment. In fact, the total number of
institutions is independent of the minimum participation rule. While more large
institutions are formed under the strict rule that requires the participation of
all players, small (3-player) institutions are frequently formed if the minimum
participation requirement is weakened either from the very beginning or else in a
second stage. Overall eciency in the experiment is highest in those treatments
that start with or are restricted to the strict unanimity rule.
Moreover, as we have seen, observed behavior in the experiment is consistent
with a majority of subjects having standard preferences and at most one third
being strongly inequality averse. In that sense, our results stand in contrast to
the ndings by Kosfeld et al. (2009) who nd that most players are not willing
to implement institutions that do not involve all group members which can only
be explained if most players are strongly inequity averse.
While we are hesitant to draw any bold policy conclusions from our small
scale laboratory experiment, we nevertheless believe that our results support the
idea that using strict minimum participation rules is best whenever it comes to
the implementation of a policy, e.g. a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto protocol.
In particular, the fear that a strict rule exacerbates the implementation of an
institution appears to be unwarranted.
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